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INTRODUCTION

Suppose a landowner buys two identically sized, adjacent lots with
separate deeds in a single transaction. One lot is dry land, while the
other is half dry land and half wetlands. A wetlands regulation forbids
t B.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005;J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law
School, 2013; Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98. The author would like to
thank Professors Gregory S. Alexander, Mitchel Lasser, Eduardo Pefialver, and Laura Underkuffler for their invaluable encouragement and advice, without which this piece would
not be possible. Thank you also to Maryam Toossi, Judah Druck, Daniel Bakey, Sue Pado,
and other members of the Cornell Law Review for your time, effort, and support throughout
this process. Finally, I am deeply grateful for my friends and family for their faith and belief
in me all these years.
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all construction on the wetlands. Pursuant to the Takings Clause of
the U.S. Constitution,' the landowner brings a case claiming that the
regulation has taken her property, requiring compensation. Under
the Supreme Court's regulatory takings doctrine, courts must determine the regulation's economic impact-the extent to which the regulation impacts the property's value. If the regulation renders the
property valueless-causing a 100% loss-the regulation constitutes a
taking, requiring just compensation. 2 So has the regulation impaired
25%, 50%, or 100% of the owner's property? That depends on
whether the "relevant parcel" is the two lots combined, one lot, or just
the wetlands portion of the property. What criteria should be used to
determine the relevant parcel? Various factors-the deed, adjacency,
the single transaction, and the nature of the regulation-could be
used to determine the relevant parcel, with varying results. This is the
issue of conceptual severance, also known as the denominator
problem.
Conceptual severance 4 refers to plaintiffs' attempts to conceptually sever their property physically, functionally, or temporally to
show that a regulation diminishes a significant portion or 100% of the
parcel's value.5 The Supreme Court has accepted some of these attempts at conceptual severance but has failed to provide a coherent
theory justifying conceptual severance. 6 As a result, confusion and debate ensue among courts and commentators on how best to determine the relevant parcel in a regulatory takings claim.7 Lower courts
can and do accept the plaintiffs proffered denominator without intense scrutiny, sometimes avoiding the conceptual severance issue altogether.8 This Note proceeds on the assumption that there is too
much uncertainty in the relevant parcel determination and seeks to
reevaluate the role of conceptual severance in U.S. regulatory takings
See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
2 See infra Part L.A.
3 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1192-93 (1967).
4 First coined by Margaret Jane Radin in The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).
5 See infra Part I.B.
6
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY.
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 92-93 (2006). Professor Alexander also
suggests that the fate of conceptual severance depends on the ever-shifting composition of

the Court. See id. at 80, 93.
7 See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVrL. L. 175, 177 (2004).
8
See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177-81 (Fed. Cir.

1994) (noting that the overall takings question requires a determination of whether the
regulation interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations and that the denominator question is a flexible, factual inquiry).
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doctrine through a comparative lens, looking to the European Court
of Human Rights9 and Canada for contrast.' 0
The goal here is not to provide a comprehensive doctrinal solution to conceptual severance; rather, this Note tries to answer an antecedent question: What function does conceptual severance currently
serve in U.S. regulatory takings doctrine? A comparative approach is
ideally situated for this task because although most (if not all) advanced Western democracies employ land-use regulations that impinge on private property interests, each system may employ a
different set of solutions for resolving land-use disputes. Comparisons
to the ECtHR and Canada provide needed contrast and help shed
light on the idiosyncrasies of our approach to the basic conflict between private property rights and public interests." Our understanding of conceptual severance's functions and flaws will only be more
apparent upon companson.
This Note makes two contributions to the area. First, a comparative analysis demonstrates that conceptual severance in U.S. regulatory
takings jurisprudence is a ripe tool for concealing ad hoc judicial balancing of private property rights against the public interest. The
United States takes a definitional or constitutive approach to regulatory
takings, asking whether the regulation's burden on an individual
property owner has gone "too far" so as to constitute a compensable
taking. 12 The inquiry focuses almost entirely on the extent of an
owner's loss, an issue that mostly hinges on whether conceptual severance is permitted. The competing public interest behind a regulation
is not extensively considered under the current framework. Lacking a
coherent rule or standard on conceptual severance, courts are implicitly invited to engage in ad hoc balancing of the private versus public
interests at stake.
Second, this Note contends that to rectify the hazards associated
with conceptual severance, the relevant parcel inquiry should be
stated in terms of an objective inquiry-the relevant parcel should be
what the claimant reasonably expects the parcel to be, taking into ac9 The ECtHR was chosen over the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) because the ECJ
has consistently deferred to the ECtHR in matters relating to human rights and property
rights. See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatoy Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
FragmentedInternationalLaw, 102 AM.J. INT'L L. 475, 502 (2008) (noting that as a result of

guaranteeing fundamental rights, including property rights, in the Treaty on European
Union, there "is a significant mandate for the ECJ to apply the norms of the ECHR").
10 As conceptual severance and regulatory takings in the United States has mainly
arisen in the land-use context, comparative analysis will be limited to the land-use context
as much as possible.
I

See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that a comparative approach may help

yield insight into whether a particular practice is necessary); infra note 98 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part L.A.
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count the property's characteristics, the owner's expectations regarding the property's uses, and the community's background
expectations in regards to property rights and land-use regulations.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of U.S.
regulatory takings jurisprudence and examines the various forms of
conceptual severance and their treatment by the Court. Part II
presents the European Court of Human Rights' approach to regulatory takings. Part III reviews Canada's regulatory takings scheme.
Part IV seeks to address the underlying question: What roles or functions does conceptual severance play in our regulatory takings jurisprudence? A Conclusion follows.
I
CONCEPTUAL SEVERANCE IN

U.S.

TAKINGS LAW

This section first provides an overview of U.S. regulatory takings
doctrine and then proceeds to examine conceptual severance, its case
law, and the surrounding debate.
A.

Protecting Property Rights Against Regulations That Go "Too
Far"

As a threshold matter, the Takings Clause requires that government takings of private property be for a "public use."' 3 If a public
use is not present, the government cannot take that property, regardless of compensation. In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of whether New London's
condemnation of residential property for an economic development
plan satisfied the public use requirement. 14 The Court construed
public use broadly, equating it with "public purpose"; governments
may not transfer property from one individual to another for purely
private purposes, but property may be taken and transferred to a private party where it serves a public purpose.15 The Court noted a
"longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field" and upheld New London's exercise of eminent domain on the
basis that the city development plan served a public purpose, thus satisfying the public use requirement. 16 Since Kelo, commentators see
the public use requirement as an extremely easy hurdle for the government to satisfy; almost any government project or regulation will
qualify for the public use requirement.17
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
See id. at 472.
See id. at 477-80.
16 See id. at 480, 488-89.
17 Cf Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 1412, 1413 (2006) (noting that although Kelo "broke no new legal ground; it merely
13

14
15
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Beyond the public use requirement, government regulations that
go "too far" will amount to a taking of property requiring just compensation.18 The foundational case for modern regulatory takings jurisprudence, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
characterizes the "too far" test as "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,"
marked by the balancing of several factors.19 These include "It]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations," and "the character of the governmental action."20
These factors can be thought of as proxies for eminent domain-like
conduct.2 1 The heart of the inquiry is whether the regulation is more
like an act of eminent domain or a routine exercise of state police
powers to regulate public health and safety.2 2
In the decades following Penn Central, the Supreme Court qualified the open-ended "too far" test by announcing two per se rules on
takings. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., defendant
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation installed some cable
boxes and cable lines on top of Loretto's apartment building without
her permission, pursuant to a state law authorizing such installations.2 3 Finding that the installation constituted a permanent physical
occupation, the Court held that because "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking," regardless of the public
interest at stake or the extent of physical occupation, 24 the state law
effected a taking, requiring compensation.2 5 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, South Carolina passed a beach preservation law
banning all construction on Lucas's two vacant beachfront lots.2 6 Relying on the trial court's undisputed finding that the construction ban
rendered the lots valueless,2 7 Justice Antonin Scalia announced that a

affirmed a longstanding rule that a taking evidences the constitutionally required 'public
use' whenever the state acts within its police powers," critics across the political spectrum
found Kelo's broad interpretation of "public use" unappealing).
18 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
19 See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
20 Id. In addition to the factors listed above, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Mahon
listed several other factors that should also be considered in this inquiry. See ALEXANDER,
supra note 6, at 75.
21 See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 133 (2002).
22 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
23 See 458 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1982).
24 See id. at 426.
25 See id. at 441.
26 See 505 U.S. 1003, 1008-09 (1992).
27 See id. at 1009.
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regulation that "denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land" will constitute a per se taking.28
Aside from the two per se rules of Loretto and Lucas, regulatory
takings claims remain subject to the multifactor Penn Central balancing test, where the regulation's impact on the property plays a significant role.29 Courts ask: How close is the deprivation to a total or
100% loss? As the deprivation approaches 100%, the regulation is
more likely to constitute a taking (if the deprivation is 100%, then the
regulation is a taking per Lucas).3o The property owner, in an attempt
to show that the regulation has caused a significant deprivation, will
want to minimize the denominator of the deprivation calculationthe smaller the denominator, the larger the overall fraction, assuming
the numerator remains unchanged. Accordingly, the property owner
may attempt to conceptually sever the property into smaller segments
and claim that a particular segment is the relevant parcel for this
inquiry.
Various forms of conceptual severance have been attempted over
the years with varying levels of success before the Supreme Court. But
the Court has not addressed conceptual severance with consistency or
clarity, leaving many uncertain as to whether a pronouncement in one
case is truly binding or merely dicta.
B.

Conceptual Severance in Action

Since Professor Radin coined "conceptual severance" in 1988,
four categories of conceptual severance have emerged in the scholarly
commentary: horizontal, vertical, functional, and temporal.3 1 But further consensus is lacking; commentators disagree on the current state
of each of the four categories and how courts should address them.3 2
The following sequence for presenting conceptual severance-vertical, functional, temporal, and horizontal-coincide roughly with the
history of conceptual severance in the Supreme Court. The discus28 See id. at 1015-16. At the same time, Justice Scalia implied that a regulation that
denies all economically beneficial use would be "rare." See id. at 1018.
29 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (rejecting the "substantially advances" formula of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), and reaffirming
that Penn Centralgoverns in most takings inquiries); see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note 21,
at 132-34 (recognizing the various factors that the Court has used in conducting the "too
far" inquiry but suggesting that diminution in value is the most firmly established factor).
30 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 21, at 135.
31 See Radin, supra note 4, at 1676; Wright, supra note 7, at 193.
32 For example, some claim that the Court accepted temporal severance in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987), but the
Court clearly rejected plaintiffs' attempt at temporal severance in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002). See infra Part I.B.3; see
also Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (2008)
(suggesting that the Court has rejected conceptual severance altogether).
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sion ends with horizontal severance precisely because it is the most
difficult of all four types and constitutes the heart of conceptual
severance.
1.

Vertical Severance

Although the cases on vertical severance are relatively few, the
Supreme Court has consistently rejected vertical severance since Penn
Centralin 1978. In Penn Central, the plaintiff, Penn Central Transportation Company, challenged New York City's Landmarks Preservation
law which designated Grand Central Terminal as a protected site,
claiming the law impaired Penn Central's plans to build a high-rise
above the Terminal.3 3 Penn Central owned the Terminal in fee simple absolute but attempted to conceptually sever the air rights above
the building from the rest of the property, and claimed that the law
effectively took away all of its air rights. 3 4 The Court rejected this argument by stating:
"Taking"jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole--here,
the city tax block designated as the "landmark site."35
Rejecting vertical severance, the Court held the city's Landmarks Preservation law did not go too far and thus did not effect a taking of
Penn Central's property.3 6
Since Penn Central,courts and commentators have occasionally referred to the "parcel as a whole" rule as generally prohibiting conceptual severance. 7 For example, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, the Court, citing Penn Central, rejected vertical sever-

33
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978); see also
Wright, supra note 7, at 203 (noting that the Court has not resolved the situation where a
claimant's remaining ownership interest coincides with the denominator).
34 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
35
Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
36
See id. at 137-38.
37 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (citing Penn Centraland Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979), for the proposition that
the takings inquiry must look to the diminution in value of the parcel as a whole); Matthew
C. Porterfield, InternationalExpropriationRules and Federalism, 23 STAN. ENWL. L.J. 3, 16-17
(2004) (asserting that the Supreme Court, under Penn Central and Keystone, has rejected
physical-horizontal and vertical-severance); John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthingthe Denominatorin Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1535, 1538-39 (1994).
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ance 3 8 despite the striking similarity between the facts of Keystone and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.39
In Mahon, Pennsylvania Coal Company had sold land above its
coal reserves (i.e., the surface estate) to Mahon, with a promise from
Mahon to waive "all claim for damages that may arise from [defendant's] mining [of] the coal."4 0 Unfortunately for Pennsylvania Coal,
the Pennsylvania legislature later passed the Kohler Act, which "forbid[ ] the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsidence of . .. any structure used as a human habitation."4 1 Mahon

sued Pennsylvania Coal under the Kohler Act for an injunction to stop
further mining under the surface estate. Justice Holmes, writing for
the Court, invalidated the Kohler Act as unconstitutionally exceeding
the state's police powers because it effectively destroyed Pennsylvania
Coal's distinct interest in the support estate.4 2
In Keystone, the Court distinguished Mahon by finding that unlike
the Kohler Act, the legislation at issue, the Subsidence Act, served a
public purpose.4 3 In addition, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the
Subsidence Act made it commercially impracticable to continue mining coal.4 4 The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to conceptually sever the restricted coal from the unrestricted coal or,
alternatively, to conceptually sever the support estate from the mineral estate.4 5 The Court reasoned that the fact that some coal must
remain to support the surface is not sufficient to establish a takings
claim; the Court analogized the mining restriction to zoning restrictions limiting the square footage of buildings on any particular lot.4 6
And even though Pennsylvania state law recognizes "the support estate as a separate interest in land that can be conveyed apart from
either the mineral estate or the surface estate," the Court rejected
"such legalistic distinctions" and ruled that the support estate could
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
ComparePa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922) (holding the Kohler Act,
which prohibited mining that caused the subsidence of human residences, to be an exercise of eminent domain requiring compensation), with Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506 (upholding
an act which similarly prevented mining that caused damage to buildings).
40 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
41 Id. at 412-13.
42 See id. at 414. The support estate, when held in conjunction with the mineral estate, allows the holder to extract the layer of coal that supports the surface; when held with
the surface estate, the support estate gives the holder the right to leave the support layer
intact and prevent subsidence. See id. at 412.
43 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
44 See id. at 495-96.
45 See id. at 498-502.
46 See id. at 498 (noting that the Subsidence Act only required plaintiffs to retain two
percent of their coal reserves in the ground).
38
39
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not be vertically severed from the mineral estate held by the
plaintiffs.4 7
Despite the Court's efforts to distinguish Keystone from Mahon,
the decisions remain inconsistent to many observers. 4 8 But because
Mahon was decided in 1922 and the case was not squarely presented as
a takings claim,4 9 Penn Centraland Keystone's rejection of vertical severance is rather uncontested.
2.

Functional Severance

Unlike other forms of conceptual severance, functional severance
has been accepted by the Court to some extent, perhaps because of its
strong theoretical foundations. Indeed, conceptual severance in general, but especially functional severance, is grounded in the notion
that property is a bundle of rights.5 0 That bundle traditionally includes the rights to use, possess, exclude, and dispose. 5 ' To date, certain "functional" rights have been singled out for special treatmentthe right to exclude in Kaiser Aetna v. United States and the rights to
descent and devise in Hodel v. Irving.5 2
In KaiserAetna, the government sought to impose a right of public access on a private marina that was previously a private pond on
the basis that the development made the marina a "navigable water of
the United States."5 3 Dismissing the navigability question as one relating to Congress's authority to regulate the marina, the Court declared
that "the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right," cannot be taken without just compensation.5 4 Consequently, the government could not impose a right of
public access to the marina without compensating its owner for taking
the right to exclude the public. The importance of the right to ex47

Id. at 500.
See, e.g., Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the DenominatorProblem, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 663, 698 (1996) (suggesting that despite best efforts,Justice John Paul Stevens failed to
distinguish Mahon from Keystone).
49
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("The question is whether the
police power can be stretched so far.").
50
See Courtney C. Tedrowe, Note, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 586, 586-95 (2000) (exploring the relationship between the bundle-of-rights metaphor and conceptual severance).
51
See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EmINENT DOMAIN 59 (1985) (advocating for an extremely liberal and individualistic conception of property where property consists of the rights of "possession, use, and disposition"),
52
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 717 (1987).
53
See 444 U.S. at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 Id. at 179-80; see also Radin, supra note 4, at 1671 (discussing KaiserAetna's focus on
the fundamentality of the right to exclude).
48
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clude was reiterated three years later in Loretto.5 5 There is little doubt
that the right to exclude is generally protected from uncompensated
government taking.56
Aside from the right to exclude, the Court has recognized that
the rights to descent and devise can be severed from the property
bundle for special protection. In an attempt to reverse the increase of
fractional property interests in Indian lands following historical land
allotment legislation, Congress enacted section 207 of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act, which provides that certain small undivided
fractional interests in Indian tribal lands shall escheat back to the
tribe rather than pass by will or intestacy to individual heirs.5 7 Representatives and heirs of decedents owning interests subject to section
207 claimed that the statute took "their decedents' right to pass the
property at death," violating the Takings Clause.5 8 Like the Kaiser
Aetna Court's focus on the right to exclude, the Court in Hodel singled
out a particular right, "the right to pass property," and held that the
total destruction of this right under section 207 constituted a taking of
property.5 9
However, no other strand in the property rights bundle has been
singled out like the two above. Even the common-law preference for
marketability and alienability did not persuade the Court to accept
functional severance of the right of disposition. In Andrus v. Allard,
plaintiffs claimed that the government's prohibition on sale of eagle
feathers was a taking of property.60 The Court employed sweeping
language that could be construed as foreclosing functional severance
and conceptual severance in general: "At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand'
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in
its entirety."6 1 Loretto and Hodel, which come after Andrus, clearly limit
the breadth of this language. However, for the plaintiffs in Andrus,
the Court was unsympathetic toward their loss of the right to dispose;
instead, the Court noted that plaintiffs retained their "rights to possess

55
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982);
supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
56
But see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) (upholding
California's constitutional restriction on shopping center owner's right to exclude the public from exercising free speech and petition rights in the shopping center); cf Loretto, 458
U.S. at 434 (describing the restriction at issue in PruneYard as "temporary and limited in
nature").
57
See Hode 481 U.S. at 707-09.
58 See id. at 709-11.
59 See id. at 716-17.
60 See 444 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1979).
61 Id. at 65-66.
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and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected
birds."6 2
Andrus did not involve the sale of real property, and arguably a
different result would have emerged if the regulation restricted land
sales. But for now, it remains difficult to explain why certain rights
are functionally severable and others are not. The Court justified its
treatment of the rights to exclude, descent, and devise by declarations
of their utmost importance in history and precedent.68 Perhaps concerns about overstepping the bounds of the particular case or controversy at issue explain the Court's unwillingness to provide more clarity
in this area. In future cases, the text of Penn Central and Andrus may
work to limit the scope of functional severance.
3.

Temporal Severance

One can now safely say that temporal severance is generally prohibited, but prior to 2002, that conclusion was far from clear. Temporal severance may be the most confusing form of conceptual
severance because time can be a characteristic of many components in
a takings claim. Time is a characteristic of property interests (e.g.,
leaseholds or defeasible fees). 64 Time also characterizes the nature of
the government action (e.g., the duration of the regulation, whether
it's indefinite or effective for a finite period). Lastly, time can also be
a characteristic of the takings denominator (e.g., the right to use
property from 1991 to 1992).
Three types of takings claims must be outlined and distinguished
in this discussion: (1) Takings of temporally defined property interests
(e.g., leaseholds); (2) Temporary takings, where an enacted regulation works a taking but is later repealed or rescinded by the government and the regulatory taking becomes temporary rather than
permanent; and (3) "Temporary regulations," which are government
regulations with predefined limited duration. The first category of
takings is well recognized as requiring just compensation-if government action amounts to a taking (under the categorical rules or Penn
Central balancing test), the Takings Clause requires compensation, regardless of whether the claimant holds a leasehold interest or fee simple. 65 The second and third categories may seem similar, but they are
in fact critically different. In contrast to the latter situation, in tempoId. at 66.
See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435 (1982); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 209 (concluding "[fiunctional severance is quite incoherent" because it appears to be rather arbitrary line drawing).
64
See Wright, supra note 7, at 214 ("An obvious example of temporal severance is the
division of ownership over time with the use of future interests.").
65
See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1946); United States v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381 (1945); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
62
63
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rary takings, the takings question has already been decided in that the
regulation clearly constitutes a taking under existing doctrine. The
only question remaining is whether compensation is due in such a
case where the offending regulation ceases to exist. This is the question addressed in FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles.66 FirstEnglish held that under the Takings Clause, a taking
requires just compensation, regardless of whether the offending government regulation is later rescinded and the taking is made merely
temporary, not permanent.6 7
Despite some observations that First English was an endorsement
of temporal severance, the Court in 2002 clarified that temporal severance is generally prohibited in addressing the third category mentioned above, which I called "temporary regulations."6 8 In Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency, the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency issued a 32-month development moratorium for certain areas in the Tahoe basin. 69 At the Supreme Court,
due to procedural missteps, the plaintiffs were limited to arguing that
following Lucas and First English, the development moratoria constituted a taking by denying them all economic use of their property
during the 32-month period. 70 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that First English should not be construed as endorsing conceptual severance but was narrowly focused on a "compensation
question" or a "remedial question," never deciding whether a taking
had occurred.7 1 The Court then distinguished plaintiffs' claim from
Lucas- whereas the development moratoria at issue was a temporary
regulation, Lucas dealt with a permanent regulation that deprived an
individual of all viable economic use of a fee simple estate.72 Citing
Penn Central's "parcel as a whole" rule, Justice Stevens rejected temporal severance, holding that plaintiffs cannot conceptually sever the 32month segment from the remaining fee simple estate and claim that
the moratoria effected a taking of the 32-month segment.7 3
Reg'] Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citing Petty and General Motors with
approval).
66
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
67
See id. at 321.
68
Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 328-29, 331; see also Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1600, 1619-20 (1988) (suggesting that based on the composition of the FirstEnglish
majority, especially the presence of Justices William Brennan, Byron White, and Harry
Blackmun, who have all clearly opposed conceptual severance in earlier opinions, First
English should not be read as an endorsement of temporal severance).
69
See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 312.
70
See id. at 320-21.
71
See id. at 328-29 ("[Olur decision in FirstEnglish surely did not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical submission that petitioners are now advocating.").
72
See id. at 329-30.
7
See id. at 331.
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The Court went on to note that its holding does not establish any
bright-line rules. Temporary regulations are not categorically exempt
from regulatory takings challenges; those that go too far will constitute a regulatory taking, but the proper framework for analysis is the
multifactor balancing of Penn Central.7 4 In addition to the duration of
the regulation, landowners' investment-backed expectations and the
reasonableness or diligence of land-use planning officials will likely be
relevant considerations in evaluating temporary regulations.7 5 One
could imagine a scenario where a landowner has concrete expectations for development, but her intentions are frustrated by an unreasonably long moratorium-would such a landowner need temporal
severance to successfully challenge the regulation? If attempting to
establish a taking under Lucas, temporal severance is essential because
Lucas only asks the extent to which the regulation deprives all economically beneficial use. 76 That inquiry requires definition of "the
relevant parcel," or the denominator of the takings fraction. The
Penn Central inquiry, on the other hand, looks beyond the formulaic
calculations of the takings fraction and can rest on other factors such
as the landowner's investment-backed expectations and the nature or
character of the government action.7 7 The Tahoe majority's endorsement of Penn Central balancing indicates that while temporal severance does need not be the crux of a temporary regulation takings
claim, it could be employed to tip the scale in favor of finding a
taking.
4.

Horizontal Severance

Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court has not
directly spoken on the issue of horizontal severance.78 Horizontal severance is the stereotypical form of conceptual severance that comes to
mind when one thinks about land-use regulatory takings claims; it is
truly the heart of conceptual severance. Recall the hypothetical takings claim at the beginning of this Note. The landowner may attempt
to conceptually sever the wetlands from the dry-land portion of the
lots to argue that the government has taken 100% of her property
interest in the wetlands. In response, the government would likely
argue that the relevant parcel is the two lots combined and because
the regulation impairs only 25% of the relevant parcel, no taking has
occurred.
74

See id. at 335-37.
See id. at 333-36; Wright, supra note 7, at 217 (noting that Tahoe "left open the
possibility" that temporal severance may be appropriate in certain circumstances where
"abnormal delays, especially bad-faith governmental stalling tactics" are present).
76
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
77 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
78
See Wright, supra note 7, at 193; Fee, supra note 37, at 1544-45.
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Penn Central's "parcel as a whole" rule seems to reject the landowner's attempt at horizontal severance, but does that mean the government wins? Unfortunately, the question here is not simply
whether the Supreme Court has rejected or accepted horizontal severance. Even if one assumes that horizontal severance is generally disallowed, the same underlying question still remains: What constitutes
the "parcel as a whole"? Further, one should hesitate to read too
much from Penn Central. For one, Professor Radin suggests that despite Penn Central,the Court in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission79
"engaged in [horizontal] severance by construing a public access easement as a complete thing taken, separate from the parcel as a
whole."8 0 Also, the Court recognized the issue of horizontal severance
in Lucas but declined to announce any clear rules on the issue.ai
In the absence of definitive rules for determining the relevant
parcel, there are a variety of tests-some used by lower courts, some
proposed by commentators. In a footnote in Lucas, Justice Scalia suggested looking to state law specifically to see whether state law recognizes or protects the specific property interest at issue, as a factor in
the relevant parcel determination.8 2 However, state law is unhelpful
in the horizontal context because under state law, landowners can
freely subdivide larger parcels into smaller ones-there likely would
be no limit to horizontal severance if state law alone guided the relevant parcel determination.8 3 The denominator problem is often complicated by the fact that the landowner owns multiple parcels in the
vicinity, some of which have been purchased and sold over multiple
transactions.
Lower courts generally consider a variety of factors to determine
parcel: (1) extent of ownership, (2) contiguity of parcels,
relevant
the
(3) date of acquisition, (4) owner treatment of the parcel as a single
unit or part of a larger parcel, and (5) the nature of the government
action. 84 However, there is no set formula in considering these fac-

79 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Radin, supra note 4, at 1676-77.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) ("Regrettably, the
rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its
precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss
of value is to be measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation
as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the
burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.").
82 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
80
81

83

See Fee, supra note 37, at 1556.

84 See, e.g., Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991) (noting that "[flactors
such as the degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, (and] the extent to which the
parcel has been treated as a single unit" should be considered in the relevant parcel inquiry). In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, the question was whether the relevant
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tors; some factors will be more relevant than others depending on the
facts of each case.
Professor John Fee, after a thorough analysis of lower court decisions employing the factors above, ultimately rejects a multifactor approach in favor of a single test, one which asks whether the plaintiffs
asserted property contains "one economically viable use, independent
of the surrounding land."8 5 Professor Fee argues that instead of examining the owner's subjective plans or investment-backed expectations, courts should focus on whether the asserted parcel is
"substantial enough to warrant Fifth Amendment protection as an independent bundle of rights." 6 Under Fee's approach, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving that "the property in question could profitably
be put to use if it were the owner's only parcel."8 7
Such a "substantiality" requirement for horizontal severance is admirable, even desirable, but why should economic viability and profitability be the only marker for substantiality? Mark Lisker rejects
bright-line rules and instead proposes "an analytical framework to
guide courts in making the denominator determination." 8 Recognizing the wide factual variations in takings claims and practical difficulties in balancing private against governmental interests, Lisker argues
that courts should consider a multitude of factors in determining the
relevant parcel, including state property law, economic viability, investment-backed expectations, unity of ownership, and contiguity of
property.89 In essence, Lisker endorses the multifactor, flexible inquiry employed by many lower courts and rejects any definitive rule
on horizontal severance.9 0 Like Professor Fee, Lisker maintains that
courts should start with the plaintiffs proposed denominator and impose additional tests or inquiries to determine the relevant parcel.9 1
parcel should be the 250-acre parcel that the plaintiffs originally purchased in 1958, the 51
acres that remained undeveloped, or the 12.5 acres (mostly wetlands) that plaintiffs actually sought to fill and develop at the time of trial. 28 F.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs claimed that the Army Corps of Engineers, in denying their request for a fill
permit under the Clean Water Act, effectively denied all economically viable use of the
12.5-acre parcel and effected a taking under Lucas. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed, reasoning that because the NewJersey Department of Environmental
Protection had previously extracted a promise from the plaintiff not to develop 38.5 acres
of the 51-acre property, it is only fair that those 38.5 acres should not be considered part of
the relevant parcel in this subsequent takings claim against the federal government. Id.
85
Fee, supra note 37, at 1557.
86
87
88

89

Id.
Id. at 1560.
Lisker, supra note 48, at 669.
See id. at 719-25.

90 See id. at 723. Under Lisker's approach, the Ciampitticourt correctly rejected plaintiff's attempt to sever the regulated wetlands from the upland portion of his property, and
the court in Loveladies was also correct to horizontally sever lands previously developed by
the plaintiff.
91 See Fee, supra note 37, at 1557; Lisker, supra note 48, at 720.
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While these authors recognize the concern that property owners and
governments can manipulate conceptual severance to their own ends,
both argue that the adversarial system will mitigate such concerns. 9 2
More recently in 2004, Professor Danaya Wright analyzed the
Court's reception of conceptual severance in great detail and argued
that the Court has missed the boat completely by treating property as
a static object fixed in time.9 3 Professor Wright ultimately suggests
that the Court should not uniformly reject or accept conceptual severance but should instead look at a landowner's prior actions to determine if the landowner contributed to the severity of her current
deprivation.94 Consistent with common law rules of reciprocity and
severance,9 5 if the landowner voluntarily severed and sold part of his
or her property and a regulation now prohibits the landowner from
using the remaining parcel in ways injurious to the previously owned
property, Wright argues that courts should take into account the fact
that the landowner previously owned both properties and voluntarily
severed them, thus contributing to the current state.96 Under this regime, large developers will likely be disadvantaged in takings claims
because those same developers contributed to their current deprivation in developing and severing their land. Professor Wright contends
that when landowners have already profited from the sale of those
properties, the Takings Clause should not be twisted to bestow additional benefits.9 7
The various answers to conceptual severance outlined above have
their share of advantages and disadvantages. This Note does not purport to provide a solution to "the problem of conceptual severance."
Instead, this Note contends that before proposing a solution to conceptual severance, an understanding of conceptual severance's role in
U.S. regulatory takings doctrine is needed-that is, what functions
does conceptual severance serve in the current doctrine? Are those
functions compatible with our normative emphasis on the rule of law,
transparency, and rationality in judicial decision making? We can begin to formulate a response to the "problem" of conceptual severance
only after those preliminary questions have been answered.
This Note seeks to answer those basic questions through a comparative approach. Comparisons allow one to separate form from
function and to see how different legal systems address the same prob92
93
94
95
96

97

See Fee, supra note 37, at 1560; Lisker, supra note 48, at 729.
See Wright, supra note 7, at 193-218.
See id. at 179-80.
See id. at 224-28.
See id. at 235.
See id. at 241.
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lem through different rules and institutions.9 8 Comparisons also
demonstrate the range of possible solutions for a given problem and
may help in the later stage of formulating a solution to that problem.9 9 Given that conflicts between land-use regulations and private
property interests exist in many (if not all) advanced Western democracies, a comparison of U.S. regulatory takings to the European Court
of Human Rights and Canada will provide insight on how conceptual
severance furthers the goals of the regulatory takings doctrine.
II
EUROPEAN COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS

A.

Protecting Property Through Proportionality

Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention) 0 0 established the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) to ensure member states uphold the Convention's human
rights guarantees. The ECtHR is empowered to hear interstate or individual complaints against all member states, declare national laws in
breach of the Convention, and award compensation in limited
cases.1 01 Like the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, the drafters of the
European Convention disagreed on whether and to what extent property rights should be protected. To prevent further delay in establishing a human rights treaty, the Convention was finalized without
mention of property rights. 0 2 After the Convention was signed in
1950, drafters continued to work on a property clause and within two
years, Protocol 1 to the Convention was signed with Article 1 on the
protection of property rights:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
98
See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 34 (Tony
Weir trans., Oxford University Press 3d rev. ed. 1998) (presenting the functionalist methodology employed here).
99 See id. at 43-44, 46-47 (discussing the choice of a best solution or the formation of
a solution through comparisons).
100
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 19, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 234 [hereinafter Convention].
101
See ROBIN C.A. WHITE & CLARE OVEY, JACOBS, WHITE, & OVEY: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (5th ed. 2010).
102
See DRAGOLJUB Popovie, PROTECTING PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN HUMAN RIcHTs LAw

(2009).
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the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 03
These three sentences of Article 1, Protocol 1 each have their own
legal effect, yet at the same time the relationship between the three
rules is complex, and they must be read together to understand their
full effect. The first sentence (rule 1), which guarantees "peaceful
enjoyment of . . . possessions," is a general guarantee of property

rights, requiring all state interference with property to satisfy a general
proportionality test. 0 4 The latter two sentences (rules 2 and 3)
greatly limit the property guarantee of rule 1 by allowing state deprivation 0 5 and regulation of property under certain conditions.
In an Article 1 claim, the ECtHR first examines the nature and
character of the government action in question to determine which
rule applies.' 0 6 Rule 2 applies in cases of "deprivation" (i.e., where
the claimant is deprived of his title and entire property interest either
through a formal transfer of title or a government act that effectively
expropriates the property).107 Rule 3 applies in most cases involving
land-use regulations. That said, all government interferences with
property rights are evaluated under the same framework: the interference must be (1) lawful, (2) in pursuit of a legitimate public interest,
and (3) proportional to the interest to be served.10 For an interference to be lawful, the interference must comply with the member
state's laws and comport with the "rule of law" in that the legal basis
for the interference should be "accessible, precise and foreseeable."1 0 9
On the public interest element, the Court gives states great deference
on whether the interference serves a legitimate public interest."1 0
103 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Article 1].
104 See Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1982); WHITE & OVEY, Supra
note 101, at 503-05.
105
"Deprivation" as used by the ECtHR refers generally to expropriation, the physical
appropriation of land by a state, either through formal exercises of eminent domain or de
facto possession. See generally Porovia, supra note 102, at 30-41 (detailing the various
forms of deprivation or expropriation that have been recognized in ECtHR case law).
106 See, e.g., Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24-25 (noting that the court must
look at the "realities of the situation" in the absence of formal expropriation).
107 See generally Porovue, supra note 102, at 29-41 (discussing the various categories of
expropriation that are recognized as "deprivations" by the Court). For further discussion
on whether a regulation may amount to a deprivation, see infra Part II.B.
108 See Popove, supra note 102, at 52.
109 See Carbonara v. Italy, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, 107; Tom Allen, Compensationfor
Property Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 28 MicH. J. INT'L L. 287, 293 (2007).
110 SeeJames v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 9, 32 (1986) ("The Court
... will respect the legislature's judgment as to what is 'in the public interest' unless that
judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation."); see also Helen Mountfield, Regulatory Expropriationsin Europe: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights, 11 N.Y.U.
ENvrL. L.J. 136, 140-41 (2002) (noting that the Court has never "rejected a government's
submission that a measure was in the public interest").
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The main limit on a member state's ability to interfere with property
rights is the last requirement of proportionality.
When evaluating state actions for proportionality, the Court asks
"whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection
of the individual's fundamental rights.""' Proportionality does not
exist where the claimant has to bear "an individual and excessive burden."1 12 Yet proportionality does not require strict necessity-the interference does not need to be a necessary condition for achieving
legislative aims; as long as there is "a reasonable relationship .

.

. be-

tween the means employed and the aim sought to be realized," the
interference is proportional and valid.1 13 If the interference constitutes a rule 2 deprivation, absent "exceptional circumstances," the
lack of any compensation will imply that the interference is disproportional.114 But proportionality does not require compensation for regulations falling under rule 3. Proportionality ultimately involves a
case-by-case analysis of the facts, including the design of the interference and the availability of domestic processes to challenge the
interference.
For example, in the landmark case of Sporrong v. Sweden, the
Swedish government, in preparation to acquire plaintiffs' properties,
issued expropriation permits and prohibited construction for many
years, ranging from eight to twenty-five years.' 15 Despite the inapplicability of rules 2 and 3, the Court held the expropriation permits
were interferences subject to the general proportionality requirement
of rule 1.116 The Court found that because the expropriation permit
and construction ban were in place for long periods of time, and
Swedish law provided no process to petition for relief, the permit and
ban, imposing an excessive burden on the plaintiffs, failed proportionality and violated Article 1.117

III Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26; see also AJ VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY CLAUSEs 118-19 (1999) (noting the balance that must be struck between protect-

ing the right of property and general public interest).
112
Sporrong, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28.
113 James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35.
114 See id. at 36 (noting that only under exceptional circumstances will deprivation
without compensation be deemed proportional). However, compensation less than full
market value may be sufficient to satisfy the proportionality requirement. See Allen, supra
note 109, at 299-300.
115 See 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 10-12.
116 See id. at 23-24 (finding the expropriation permits did not constitute regulations
on use nor formal or de facto deprivations because plaintiffs retained title to the properties
and could "use, sell, lor] devise ... their properties").
117 See id. at 26-28.
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An Emerging Regulatory Takings Doctrine?

Although Article 1 divides government actions into deprivations
and regulations, the line separating deprivations and regulations is far
from clear. The Court has not rejected the notion that a regulation
that goes too far may constitute a compensable deprivation under rule
2,118 but neither has the Court ever found a land-use regulation to
constitute a deprivation under rule 2.
In Fredin v. Sweden, the Swedish government, pursuant to environmental laws, revoked the Fredins' twenty-year-old gravel exploitation
license, even though the Fredins had only started extracting gravel
four years earlier.11 9 The Fredins argued that the revocation of the
license deprived "their property of all its value" and amounted to a de
facto deprivation requiring compensation under rule 2. The government, on the other hand, claimed the revocation was merely a regulation on use, a valid exercise of the state's powers under rule 3.120 The
ECtHR acknowledged the interference was not a formal deprivation
but nevertheless accepted that the issue was "whether the consequences of the revocation . .. were so serious as to amount to a defacto
deprivation of property."I 21
Ultimately, the ECtHR rejected the Fredins' deprivation-of-allvalue argument by finding that the gravel pit itself was not the appropriate scope of inquiry because the Fredins owned the surrounding
land and created the gravel pit lot "from parts of their existing properties for the sole purpose of [operating] . . . the gravel pit business."1 2 2
Finding that the revocation did not affect the Fredins' property holdings in totality, the ECtHR held that the revocation did not amount to
a de facto deprivation in violation of Article 1 and upheld the revocation as a lawful and proportional restriction on use under rule 3.123
Note that the ECtHR appears to have engaged in a bit of reverse conceptual severance in finding the relevant property to be all of the
Fredins' property in the vicinity, rather than the legal parcel proposed
by the plaintiffs.12 4
Putting aside the doctrinal distinctions between deprivations, regulations, and the related issue of compensation, the proportionality
test allows the ECtHR to invalidate any type of interference, regardless
118

119

See VAN DER WALT, supra note 111, at 108, 112.

192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9-10 (1991).
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
See id. at 15-18.
Cf Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (rejecting plaintiffs claim to conceptually sever air rights above Grand Central Terminal and
instead finding the relevant parcel to be "the city tax block designated as the 'landmark
site'").
120
121
122
123
124
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of whether it is classified as a deprivation under rule 2, a regulation
subject to rule 3, or a general interference. 125 An inflexible regulation that produces little benefit to the public while severely restricting
property rights may impose an excessive burden on property owners
and fail proportionality. Whether a particular interference fails proportionality will depend on the weight given to the legislative aims
promoted by the regulation and the private property interest at stake.
In some sense, the proportionality test is quite like Penn Central balancing as both require courts to engage in detailed factual inquiries,
balance various factors, and arguably pass substantive judgment on national legislation.12 6
But unlike the American focus on the extent of the owner's loss,
the ECtHR takes into account both the effect of the interference on
the property interest and the aim sought to be achieved through the
government interference. Implicit in Article 1 is the understanding
that property rights are never absolute-they are always limited by legitimate public concerns as manifested in domestic legislation. The
main question for the ECtHR is whether the state action is justifiable
under the standards announced in rule 2 or 3.127 The drafters of the
Convention knew that many governmental measures would come to
limit and even destroy property rights.s2 8 In that sense, the European
approach is realistic and honest-realistic in that they acknowledge
the ubiquitous nature of governmental interference with private
rights and honest because the ECtHR does not purport to have a perfect test to distinguish interferences from noninterferences and instead focuses on striking an appropriate balance between the public
interest and the protection of private rights.
III
CANADA

A.

Statutory Property Protection

Unlike the ECtHR and the United States, Canada did not enshrine property rights in its Constitution. Fearing that politically unaccountable courts would be empowered to strike down social welfare
and redistributive legislation, the drafters of the Constitution Act of
1982 consciously excluded property rights from the Charter of Rights
125
See supra text accompanying notes 115-17 (noting that all forms of governmental
interference could be held invalid if they fail the proportionality test).
126 See Allen, supra note 109, at 302 (noting that decisions are based on broad principles and standards rather than specific rules); Mountfield, supra note 110, at 141-42 (noting that the precise factors taken into account vary from case to case).
127 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
128 See PopovIn, supra note 102, at 4-7.
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and Freedoms, Canada's constitutional bill of rights.' 2 9 There is nothing equivalent to the Takings Clause or Article 1 in Canada's Constitution. 3 0 The true protector of property rights in Canada is the
political process. 13 ' Canada protects property rights by providing
compensation under Expropriation Acts at the federal and provincial
level.' 32 These Acts may be amended or repealed like any other ordinary piece of legislation. However, just as the United States developed
its regulatory takings jurisprudence out of the Takings Clause, Canadian courts, through their interpretation of the Expropriation Acts,
have developed doctrines to evaluate whether burdensome regulations may amount to compensable expropriations. 3 3
At Canadian common law, there is no right to compensation
aside from statutory protections,13 4 but there is a statutory interpretive
rule that favors compensation which says that in the absence of explicit language precluding compensation, legislation will not be construed to authorize expropriations without compensation.13 5 In
129
See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 1003 (Can.); Bryan
P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada,5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.

L. REv. 477, 479-80 (2006) (noting that the framers of the Constitution Act of 1982 excluded property rights guarantees to ensure that Canadian courts could not block social
welfare legislation).
130
Note that Canada has a "statutory" bill of rights, not to be confused with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has constitutional status. The Canadian Bill of Rights, a
federal statute enacted in 1960, guarantees the "enjoyment of property, and the right not
to be deprived thereof except by due process of law." Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.
44 § 1(a) (Can.). However, section 1(a) offers little protection for property owners as it
only applies to the federal government and not provincial governments. See Donna R.
Christie, A Tale of Three Takings: Takings Analysis in Land Use Regulation in the United States,
Australia, and Canada, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 343, 372 (2007). Further, section 1(a) has

been interpreted to only guarantee basic procedural protections for property owners
against expropriations. See Authorson v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, para. 42
(Can.). Finally, the legislature may declare the Bill of Rights inapplicable to subsequent
legislation. See id. at para. 32.
131
See Schwartz & Bueckert, supra note 129, at 491 (noting that property rights are
minimally protected by the Canadian Constitution and the Canadian Bill of Rights).
132 See Christie, supra note 130, at 350 & n.66 ("The federal government and all the
provinces and territories have, however, enacted land expropriation acts and other statutes
to include compensation provisions."). Other statutes related to specific topics may also
specify expropriation and compensation requirements. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.

133

See infra Part III.B.

134 In Authorson v. Canada,the Canadian Supreme Court made clear that Parliament
has a well-recognized right to expropriate property without compensation, as long as it
makes its intention clear. See 2 S.C.R. at para. 53-55 (citing numerous cases that establish
the right of the sovereign to expropriate private property without compensation).
135 See Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, 109 (Can.) (quoting
a British House of Lords case, Att'y Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508
(H.L.) 542, which establishes the interpretive presumption in favor of compensation). But
see Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v. British Columbia (1993), 99 D.L.R. 4th 199, 206-08 (Can.
B.C. C.A.) (rejecting application of the Manitoba interpretive presumption and plaintiffs
claim for compensation even though the statute in question contained no reference to
compensation).
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Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen, federal legislation that partially
nationalized fish processing companies was silent on whether compensation would be provided to those who, as a result of the Act, were
prohibited from operating their businesses.13 6 The Supreme Court of
Canada held that because the Act effectively deprived plaintiff of its
goodwill and thus constituted a taking of property, the plaintiff was
entitled to compensation for the loss of business under the interpretive presumption in favor of compensation. 1 7 However, this is merely
an interpretive rule; if legislation clearly provides for expropriation
without compensation, this common law presumption is inapplicable.
Further, this interpretive presumption assumes that the government
action amounts to an expropriation. On this latter question of
whether there has been an expropriation, the Canadian courts have
shown a reluctance to construe "expropriation" broadly.
B.

Regulatory Expropriations Based on Public Benefit

Canadian courts have held government regulations amounted to
expropriations (i.e., takings) in a very limited number of cases.' 38 In
the landmark case of The Queen v. Tener, plaintiffs holding mineral
rights to certain lands in Wells Gray Provincial Park argued that the
government's refusal to issue park-use permits prohibited plaintiffs
from mining the mineral deposits and amounted to an expropriation
of their mineral rights.' 3 9 The Canadian Supreme Court held that
because the refusal to issue a permit amounted to "a recovery by the
Crown of a part of the right granted to the [plaintiffs]" and value was
thereby transferred from the plaintiffs to the Government, the government had effectively "expropriate [d]" plaintiffs' mineral interests, requiring compensation pursuant to the Ministry of Highways and
Public Works Act.140 Justice Willard Estey, writing for the majority,
distinguished the expropriation permit process from zoning or property use regulations because these latter measures "add nothing to the
value of public property" and thus are not expropriations requiring
compensation.141 Tener has since been cited for the proposition that
zoning laws affecting property rights and land values are not
compensable." 2
136 See Manitoba Fisheries, I S.C.R. at 109 ("There is no express language in the Act
providing for the payment of compensation by the federal Crown...
137
138

See id. at 118.

141

Id. at 564.

See Christie, supra note 130, at 391 n.339 (noting that "[i]n Canada, only five cases
have found regulation of property rights a compensable expropriation of property").
139 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533, 536-39 (Can.).
140 See id. at 563-64.
142 See Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Att'y Gen.) (1999), 177 D.L.R. 4th 696
passim (Can. N.S. C.A.) (referencing Tener's oft-quoted language of "compensation does
not follow zoning either up or down").
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Since Tener, courts have developed a standard two-pronged approach for determining whether a regulation amounts to a "regulatory expropriation": in addition to establishing (1) a loss of the entire
property interest, the claimant must show that (2) the government has
acquired a beneficial interest through the regulation.s4 3
The first prong of this inquiry focuses on the claimant's loss. The
Canadian Supreme Court in 2006 termed this prong the "removal of
all reasonable uses" requirement.'" A decline in property value is
evidence that the regulation removes all reasonable uses, but as the
Mariner court and other courts have held, economic loss alone is not
enough to constitute a regulatory expropriation.145 The regulation
must in effect extinguish the claimant's interest in its entirety, not
merely restrict certain strands in the bundle of rights (e.g., the right
to develop). 4 Further, this inquiry must be made in "regard to the
nature of the land and the range of reasonable uses to which it has
actually been put." 47 Residential or commercial development may
not be a reasonable use for land that is sensitive to environmental
damage, and a regulation that prohibits such development on those
lands does not necessarily amount to a removal of all reasonable
uses.s4 8 Further, if the regulation does not prohibit the existing or
historical uses of the property, the regulation likely has not removed
all reasonable uses of the property.
On the second prong of the regulatory expropriations inquiry,
the claimant must establish that the government has effectively acquired an interest in land or a property interest as a result of the regu143
See, e.g., Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Manitoba (1992), [1993] 79 Man. R. 2d 169, 174-75
(Can. Man, Q.B.) (endorsing the notion of regulatory expropriation but emphasizing that
a finding of expropriation must rest on "a resulting enhancement or improvement conferred upon" the public); cf Christie, supra note 130, at 396-98 (noting that "[t]he nature
of the enhancement or benefit the government must acquire is . . . far from clear").
144
See Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Vancouver (City), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227, para. 30 (Can.).
145 See Mariner, 177 D.L.R. 4th at 724-27 (accepting the trial court finding that the
Beach Act rendered plaintiffs' properties valueless but holding economic loss alone is not
enough to establish a regulatory expropriation). The Mariner case is factually similar to
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), which both the parties and
the court recognized. See Mariner, 177 D.L.R 4th at 732. However, Justice Thomas Cromwell, writing for the court, explicitly distinguished Canadian jurisprudence from U.S. regulatory takings because in Canada, "extensive and restrictive land use regulation is the
norm," and such regulations have "almost without exception, been found not to constitute
compensable expropriation." Id. at 713, 732.
146
See id. at 728 (noting that expropriation requires a "virtual extinction of an identifiable interest in land").
147
Id. at 717.
148
See, e.g., Mariner, 177 D.L.R. 4th at 728-29 (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that a refusal
to issue development permits for private lots on environmentally-sensitive sand dunes destroys all incidents of ownership because residential development is not the only reasonable use of the property; there were also traditional uses such as camping or gardening).
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lation.14 9 It is unclear, however, when such an acquisition has
occurred. In MarinerReal Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia, the Court reviewed
at length the two landmark cases that found compensable regulatory
expropriations- Tener and ManitobaFisheries-andconcluded that the
Court's decisions were based on the fact that the regulating authorities had effectively acquired, respectively, the claimants' mineral interests and goodwill.1 50 The Court also indicated that regulations
freezing development generally do not result in the government acquisition of an interest.1 5 1
Most recently in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Vancouver (City),
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) challenged a city bylaw that effectively
prohibited CPR from redeveloping an unused railway corridor, confining "CPR to uneconomic uses of the land."15 2 The Supreme Court
held that the City of Vancouver did not acquire a beneficial interest in
land when "[t]he City has gained nothing more than some assurance
that the land will be used or developed in accordance with its vision."15 3 The Court also found the bylaw did not remove all reasonable uses of the property because CPR could continue to use the
corridor for rail traffic.15 4 Professor Russell Brown suggests that perhaps the beneficial interest acquired must be a "tangible one" and
that the interest acquired by the City of Vancouver in CanadianPacific
Railway was not concrete enough to satisfy the government acquisition
requirement. 5 5
On the whole, one can safely say that the current state of Canadian regulatory expropriations law is unfriendly toward property owners as they must satisfy stringent and indefinite standards to establish a
regulatory expropriation.156
Thus, although Canadian courts have not directly addressed conceptual severance, it can be inferred that the use of conceptual severance would be rejected or very restricted in Canadian law. Because
complete loss of economic value alone is insufficient to establish an
149
See CanadianPac. Ry. Co., I S.C.R. at 239, para. 30 ("For a defacto taking requiring
compensation at common law, two requirements must be met: (1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of

the property . . .").

See Mariner, 177 D.L.R. 4th at 722-23.
Id. at 734.
See CanadianPac. Ry. Co., I S.C.R. at 231-33.
153
See id. at 239-40, para. 33.
154
See id. at 240.
155
See Russell Brown, The Constructive Taking at the Supreme Court of Canada:Once More,
Without Feeling, 40 U.B.C. L. REv. 315, 323 (2007).
156 See Michael A. Marion, Compensation Where No Land Is Taken: Update of the Law in
Alberta, 48 ALTA. L. REv. 127, 129 (2010) (noting that claims that a government project has
impacted property rights "to such an extent that it constitutes a de facto expropriation ...
are possible, [but] they are inherently difficult to prove and generally restricted by the
courts").
150
151
152
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expropriation (unlike Lucas), conceptual severance and especially
horizontal severance loses much of its importance. Conceptual severance can only help plaintiffs show that a regulation causes all economic loss or destroys particular strands in the bundle of rights.
When plaintiffs must establish that a regulation removes "all reasonable uses"' 5 7 or takes "virtually all incidents of ownership,"' 5 8 severing a
property interest into segments smaller than the entire ownership interest simply makes little sense.
Finally, because there is no established right to compensation in
Canada, 5 9 property owners have little incentive to bring takings challenges. When a regulation adversely affects property rights, owners
can (1) do nothing and live with the consequences of a regulation, (2)
use the political process to change the regulation or associated laws so
that it works for them, or (3) try to challenge the regulation. Since
Canada's regulatory expropriations jurisprudence makes it extremely
difficult to challenge land-use regulations and receive compensation,
options 1 and 2 appear to be better solutions for injured property
owners. Putting aside option 1, property owners must resort to the
political process to strengthen property rights against encroaching
regulations.

IV
MANY

RoADS To REGULATORY TAKINGS

A. Three Systems, One Common Goal
Parts I through III presented the regulatory takings jurisprudence
of the United States, the European Court of Human Rights, and
Canada.
In some respects, the United States, the ECtHR, and Canada vary
widely in their protection of property rights. In practice, however, all
three systems are committed to protecting property rights, seeking to
achieve a balance between those rights and advancing the state's interest in regulating property for health, safety, and the common welfare.
The ECtHR makes explicit these goals in its enunciation of the proportionality test, which asks "whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the
requirements of the protection of [property] rights."o6 0 In Canada,
given the lack of constitutional property protection, the balancing of
157 CanadianPac. Ry. Co., 1 S.C.R. at 230.
158 Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Att'y Gen.) (1999), 177 D.L.R. 4th 696,
702 (Can. N.S. C.A.).
See Sisters of Charity of Rockingham v. The King, [1922] 2 A.C. 315, 322 (P.C.)
159
(1922) (appeal taken from Can.).
160

SeeSporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1982); VAN DER WALT, supra

note 111, at 118-19.
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private property rights against the public interest occurs first and foremost through the political process. Under the provincial and federal
Expropriation Acts, which generally prohibit the uncompensated expropriation of property, Canadians have committed to some level of
property protection.16 1 Canadian courts, in deciding whether a government regulation amounts to an expropriation, also implicitly balance the two competing interests, albeit within the limits set by the
legislature.1 6 2 And since the beginning of U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized this fundamental private versus public tension. In Mahon, the Court partly based its
decision on finding "the public interest [in the Kohler Act] to be limited," especially when compared to the "valuable estate" taken from
the coal company.1 63
Although all three systems seek to determine when a government
regulation has gone too far in impairing property interests, they differ
significantly in their mechanics. One critical distinction between the
Europeans and the North Americans is the explicit consideration
(and lack thereof) of the public interest involved. The ECtHR's proportionality doctrine involves an explicit consideration of the public
interest at stake. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court, when
considering whether a regulation amounts to a taking, consistently
fails to consider the gravity of the public interest served by the regulation. 164 This distinction may be because the United States and Canada take a definitional approach to regulatory takings: the question
for these courts is whether the government action constitutes a taking
or expropriation. 165 The focus here is almost exclusively on the governmental action's effect on the owner. In contrast, rather than trying to determine whether the governmental action should be labeled
as a taking, the ECtHR is concerned with determining the validity of
that action given its effects on the claimant and its intended benefit to
the public.
The U.S. and Canadian approaches are ultimately more formalistic (e.g., is this regulation a taking or an expropriation?) than the
ECtHR's approach. If one thinks this difference in approach can be
161
See, e.g., Mariner, 177 D.L.R. 4th at 702 (claiming compensation is due under the
Nova Scotia Expropriation Act because the Government effectively expropriated plaintiffs
beachfront property).
162
See Christie, supra note 130, at 401; supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
163
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
164
See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 205 (citing Penn Centralas an example of where the
Court failed to address the public interest at stake in limiting development of Grand Central Terminal and the "injury to the public welfare" that would result were development
allowed). The public interest is arguably considered at the "public use" stage, but public
use is interpreted broadly and is more of a binary inquiry (is there a public interest?), as
opposed to a thorough consideration of the public interest at stake.
165

VAN DER WALT, supra note 111, at 26.
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explained on the basis that the United States and Canada protect
property rights more than the ECtHR, consider this: Canada's twopronged test for regulatory expropriations arguably imposes a higher
burden of proof for property owners than the ECtHR's proportionality test, as property owners in Canada must prove that a regulation has
effectively removed all reasonableuses and that the government has, as
a result, acquired a beneficial interest. 16 6
Another distinguishing factor is the institutional structure of the
three systems. The ECtHR's explicit consideration of the public interest may be due in part to the institutional context and goals of the
ECtHR: part of the ECtHR's mandate is to promote adherence to the
rule of law and democracy in its member states.' 6 7 It cannot credibly
fulfill this role if it disregards the democratically expressed interests of
member states.' 6 8 Whereas the ECtHR must play a more deferential
role to its member states, the U.S. Supreme Court does not, due to the
coequal status of the three branches of government and the Court's
power of judicial review. Even so, the United States' majoritarian
form of government suggests that some deference is due to the legislature when evaluating duly enacted laws. Ultimately, one must be cautious in drawing conclusions or lessons between jurisdictions,
recognizing that the role and relations between each court and the
governmental entities under review cannot be ignored in explaining
their doctrinal differences.
B.

Conceptual Severance: Merely a Path to Regulatory Takings

If one accepts that a key objective of U.S. regulatory takings doctrine is to strike an appropriate balance between private property
rights and the legitimate regulation of property for the public welfare,
the role of conceptual severance in the doctrine quickly becomes
clear. Under U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence, the public use requirement as announced in Kelo is so easily satisfied that courts have
little leeway to consider the merits of the government action and the
strength of the relevant public interest. The Court thus uses conceptual severance as "code"; it masks the Court's attempt to strike a
proper balance between private rights and public interests. For example, the real motivation behind rejecting temporal severance in TahoeSierra may have been that the public interest involved in protecting
Lake Tahoe, a "national treasure," significantly outweighed the temporary burden on plaintiffs who failed to show concrete plans for de166

See supra note 143 and accompanying text.

See Mountfield, supra note 110, at 146.
See Ratner, supra note 9, at 500-01 (noting that member states' acceptance of the
ECtHR's decisions derives in part from the court's willingness to give them latitude in
making regulations).
167
168
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velopment and resulting economic loss. 1 69 By rejecting temporal
severance, the majority found that the moratoria did not go too far
and that plaintiffs did not bear an excessive burden requiring
compensation.1 7 0
The argument that conceptual severance is masking an underlying normative weighing of private rights versus public interests is bolstered when one separates an opinion's language from its outcome. A
literal reading of the Supreme Court's opinions may lead one to conclude that property rights are more protected in the United States
than in the ECtHR since the U.S. doctrine places particular importance on certain rights in the bundle, such as the right to exclude, or
otherwise focuses almost exclusively on the owner's economic expectations and loss.17 ' But how can that be when in most takings claims,
the Supreme Court rules in favor of the government?1 72
On this reading, although U.S. courts have generally focused on
defining "the relevant parcel" by metes and bounds, time, and function, it is not clear why the denominator cannot and should not be a
landowner's total land holdings, net worth, or, in a temporal case, the
owner's remaining life expectancy. The Court's decisions on vertical,
functional, and temporal severance look like arbitrary line drawingbecause it is in a sense. That arbitrariness is more salient when one
recalls that the Court has not articulated a clear standard to determine the appropriateness of the plaintiffs proffered parcel.1 7 3 In
each of the cases discussed in Part I.B of this Note, the Court considered the propriety of the plaintiffs asserted parcel and then justified
its holding on the specific facts presented before it without attempting
to provide a coherent rule that is transferrable from one case to
another. 74
169 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307
(2002).
170 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
171 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (noting that the three
tests of Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central "focus[ ] directly upon the severity of the burden
that government imposes upon private property rights").
172 See ALEXANDER, supranote 6, at 206 (noting that the Court usually upholds regulations when it employs a balancing test). Additionally, it appears that claimants in lower
courts do not fare any better. See F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of
Prevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DuKE ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 121, 141 (2003) (noting that based on a random
sample of regulatory takings claims citing Penn Central, "owners prevailed in 13.4% of the
cases where the merits were addressed").
173 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (noting that the
"the rhetorical force" of the Lucas rule "is greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured").
174 For example, why did the Court in Penn Central hold that the relevant parcel is the
"the city tax block designated as the 'landmark site'"? Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
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Is the issue of conceptual severance a hopeless cause? This Note
asserts that it is not. Conceptual severance has a place in our regulatory takings jurisprudence; with proper definition, it does not have to
be an amorphous issue that masks courts' normative balancing of private property rights and competing public interests. After all, conceptual severance is a necessary question in determining the extent of the
property owner's loss and ultimately whether the property owner is
entitled to just compensation. Under both the Lucas and Penn Central
tests, the property owner has to demonstrate the economic impact of
the regulation and establish that this economic burden is too large for
one to bear alone.1 75
To avoid the danger of arbitrariness, the relevant parcel inquiry
must necessarily be an objective one; whether an owner is entitled to
compensation for the "loss" of her property interest should not be
based on individual characteristics, such as the owner's total land
holdings or net worth, because that has no bearing on whether one is
entitled to protection under the Takings Clause. The relevant parcel
inquiry and the question of conceptual severance should be resolved
based on the reasonable expectations of a local property owner, taking into account the nature of the parcel at the time of purchase, the
regulations in place at that time,1 76 the nature and timing of the government action at issue, and the expectations of the community in
regards to property rights and land-use regulations.17 7 This formulation is not a radical departure from existing doctrine employed by the
lower courts,' 7 8 but the emphasis here is that as a normative matter,
the relevant parcel inquiry should be an objective, reasonableness in175 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("In the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative factor."); id. at 540 ("[T]he Penn Central
inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's
economic impact . . . ."). It may be that a regulation prohibits the owner from mining
minerals on the property or restricts development on a portion of the property because it
has been designated as a nature preserve area. The plaintiff would have to demonstrate
economic impact by measuring the market value of the mineral estate if mining were allowed or of the undeveloped land if development were permitted.
176
SeePalazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'ConnorJ., concurring)
("Today's holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation's enactment relative to
the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. . . . [T]he regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the
reasonableness of [the plaintiffs] expectations.").
177
This is not an exhaustive list; other facts specific to the case at issue should inform
the "reasonable relevant parcel inquiry."
See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir.
178
1994) (noting that the relevant parcel inquiry is a flexible inquiry "designed to account for
factual nuances," including "the purpose of the imposition, the nature of the property, its
alternative uses," "the extent to which all or only a portion of plaintiffs property was so
limited," and "the timing of transfers in light of the developing regulatory environment");
Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991) (noting that "[f]actors such as the
degree of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, [and] the extent to which the parcel has
been treated as a single unit" should be considered in the relevant parcel inquiry).
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quiry if we are to avoid the arbitrariness that seemingly follows from
existing case law on conceptual severance.
Ultimately, this Note contends that conceptual severance is not as
problematic as it appears at first glance. Conceptual severance can be
seen as an arbitrary tool that determines the outcome of a takings
inquiry, but with careful definition of its contours, conceptual severance can be a flexible doctrine, providing the needed agility for courts
to deal with fact-intensive regulatory takings claims.
CONCLUSION

As society has become increasingly complex and as new land-use
challenges abound, governments have responded with regulations
that push the line between private rights and public interests, and
courts are increasingly tasked with determining when regulations have
pushed that boundary too far against individuals' property rights.
Regulatory takings and conceptual severance is the United States' response to that tension between public interests and private property
rights. And although U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence has been
criticized as a "muddle,"' 7 9 it does not have to be. One can start by
recognizing that a key source of confusion-conceptual severance-is
merely a technique for answering the question of whether a regulation goes too far.
A review of the ECtHR and Canadian regulatory takings doctrines
show that there are various methods of balancing public interests with
private property rights. Conceptual severance is a necessary evil
under our approach to regulatory takings, one which may be wholly
justified given our conception of property as a bundle of rights and
our focus on the economic impact of regulations. The challenge is to
define the contours of conceptual severance to ensure that it is not
used as a back door to slip in overreaching judicial assessments of a
regulation's merits or the legitimacy of private property interests. The
answer to conceptual severance, therefore, must be based on an objective inquiry and reasonable expectations, keeping in mind that the
Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."o80 At the very least, one
can acknowledge that conceptual severance is often a reflection of the
continual battle to find the right balance between private and public
interests, and that answer is not to be found without a careful and
transparent consideration of that balance.

179

See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 10 ("It is a commonplace among American

legal scholars that American takings law is a 'muddle.'").
180
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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